This article examines whether the assumption of perfect competition in the U.S. dairy industry biases the findings of economic impacts of generic dairy advertising. An imperfect competition model based on an approach similar to that of Appelbaurn is developed and used to evaluate generic milk advertising. The results are compared with a perfect competition model. The findings indicate positive price and quantity impacts due to generic advertising. The differences in magnitude of impacts between the two models are small, suggesting that the assumption of perfect competition for U.S. dairy models is plausible.
Almost all previous models used to evaluate the economic impacts of commodity promotion programs have assumed perfect competition in the market. However, this may not be a realistic assumption for many commodities. Market power likely exists both on the buying and selling sides of the market. For example, farmers, through their cooperatives, may exert a degree of selling power over processors buying agricultural commodities.
Alternatively, processors may have some buying power relNobuhiro Suzuki is a senior researcher with the National Research Institute of Agricultural Economics, Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. Harry M. Kaiser is an associate professor and director of the Cornell Commodity Promotion Research Program in the Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, Cornell University.
This research was supported by funds provided by the dairy farmers of New York state under authority of the New York State Milk Promotion Order and the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets. The authors thank Donald Liu, Garth Holloway, Richard Sexton, Bernard Stanton, and Jennifer Ferrero for their helpful comments.
ative to farmers or cooperatives, and/or may have some selling power over buyers of the processed products.
The existence of market power may give biased results if traditional perfect competition models are used to evaluate economic impacts of promotion programs. This is an important issue because nearly all previous studies have assumed perfect competition. Two exceptions include a study of generic milk promotion in Japan (Suzuki et al.) and an analysis of generic beef advertising in Canada and the United States (Cranfield and Goddard) .
The purpose of the current research is to determine whether the assumption of perfect competition in the U.S. dairy industry biases the findings of economic impacts of generic dairy advertising in the United States. A secondary objective is to measure the impact of generic milk advertising on dairy markets at the national level. Two models of the U.S. dairy industry are used to simulate the impacts of generic dairy advertising: (a) an imperfect competition model, and (b) a perfect compe-tition model. The imperfect competition model endogenizes the degree of market competition using an approach similar to that of Appelbaum, which is based on the assumption that dairy cooperatives maximize total revenue by equating "perceived" marginal revenue from fluid and manufacturing milk markets. Using quarterly data from 1975 through 1995, an econometric model of milk supply with fluid and manufacturing milk demand was estimated and used to simulate the impacts of milk advertising on prices and quantities. The perfect competition model treats the price premiums obtained by cooperatives through bargaining power as exogenous. A comparison of simulation results of the two models based on alternative advertising scenarios provides information on the potential magnitude of bias from the exogenous Class I premium model.
Conceptual Model
The underlying assumption of the imperfect competition model stipulates that the role of dairy cooperatives, acting as consignment milk sellers, is to allocate their members' raw milk supply to fluid (or Class I, as it will be referred to here) and manufacturing markets 1 to maximize total milk sales revenue. For most dairy farmers in the United States, the manufacturing milk price is equal to the Basic Formula Price (or the Minnesota-Wisconsin price before 1995). Therefore, the manufacturing milk price is assumed to be exogenous for 1Federal and state milk marketing orders use a system of classified pricing to price raw milk according to how it is utilized. Milk used in the most price-elastic products (e.g., butter) receives the Class III price, which is equal to the Basic Formula Price determined through market conditions in the surplus manufacturing (Grade B) milk area of the U,S. (Wisconsin and Minnesota). Milk used in the most price-inelastic fluid products receives the Class I price, which is equal to the Class III price plus a fixed fluid differential, and varies with distance from the Upper Midwest. Most federal milk marketing orders now utilize four product classes, with Class I being fluid products, Class II being soft dairy products, Class III being mostly hard dairy products, and Class IIIa being nonfat, dry milk. For simplicity, a two-class system was used in this study, with Classes II, III, and IIIa considered a single manufacturing milk class paid the Basic Formula Price. dairy cooperatives' decisions on milk allocation. With this assumption, the ith cooperative's sales-maximizing problem can be expressed as:
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where Ri is the ith cooperative's milk sales revenue, P~is Class I milk price, P. is manufacturing milk price, q} is the ith cooperative's Class I milk marketing, q' is milk quantity sent from member farmers, and {X,+,qj} is the sum of all other fluid milk marketing by cooperatives.
Equation (3) indicates the ith cooperative's conjecture of the other cooperatives' aggregate reaction function, i.e., how the cooperative believes rivals will respond to a change in Class I milk supply level.
The Lagrangian function for this problem is specified as:
The first-order conditions are:
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Taking Pm and q' as given, equations (6), (7), and (9) can be solved for u, resulting in:
Substituting (10) into (8) yields:
The term {d 2,*, qj/dq} = r 1} (conjectural variation) is the derivative of equation (3), and the
The first-order condition implies that the milk sales revenue is maximized by equating "perceived" marginal revenues from Class I and manufacturing milk. Using the conjectural elasticity, 6 = (~Q/ dq}Xqj/Qf) (i.e., Varian's k expressed in the elasticity term), equation (11 ) can be expressed as:
where 6 is the price elasticity of Class I demand in absolute value. Although Pf and 0 are not the same for all cooperatives, equation (12) is assumed to be valid for the national market level if Pf and O are translated into national average values. Equation (12) can be rearranged as:
Values for 6 can be estimated by substituting estimated values for~, and observations for P.,
and P~, into equation (13).
Although it is assumed that manufacturing milk demand (Q.) and q' are given for each cooperative's decision on milk allocation between markets in the short term, they are not exogenous at the market level. Using the relationship in (12), the imperfect competition model of the U.S. dairy industry is represented by the following six equations which contain six endogenous variables: (14) is the farm milk supply function, and equations (15) and (16) are the Class I and manufacturing milk demand functions, respectively. Equation (17) is the first-order condition for optimal milk allocation between Class I and manufacturing markets to maximize milk sales. Equation (18) is an equilibrium condition requiring farm milk supply to be equal to Class I and manufacturing processors' milk demand plus on-farm use of milk. Finally, equation (19) is the formula for the blend price, which is a weighted average price received by farmers based on the class prices and utilization of the milk supply. The above model was compared to a conventional perfect competition model where the Class I price premium was treated as an exogenous variable. The conventional model was the same as the above model, except that equation (17) was replaced with the following:
where DZFF is the exogenous Class I price differential. Note: Numbers in parentheses are r-values.
Estimated Model
The effective Class I price used in the estimation is defined as the manufacturing milk price (the Minnesota-Wisconsin price or the Basic Formula Price), plus the minimum Class I differential, plus any over-order payment. There were no data for national over-order payments for Class I milk, but the effective Class I milk price (F'f) could be estimated by solving the blend price equation for Pf:
The term BP in equation (21) refers to the allmilk price, which is a measure of the national blend price including over-order payments. Based on equation (21), the effective Class I price was 5?4 higher than the actual Class I price, on average, between 1975 and 1995. The effective Class I price computed by equation (21) may be somewhat higher than the true effective Class I price because the allmilk price includes over-order payments for Class II and Class III milk, as well as Class I milk. However, over-order premiums for Class II and Class III milk are usually much smaller on a national basis than Class I premiums, and therefore the potential upward bias in Pf from equation (21 ) is likely small.
To check for potential bias, the effective Class I price estimated from equation (21) was compared with the "announced cooperative Class I price, " which includes over-order Class I premiums, over the period 1976-90 (Suzuki et al.) . The average effective Class I price computed using equation (21) from 1976-95 was $14.32, while the average announced cooperative Class I price was $14.29. The 3@ difference, which represents 0.2% of the effective Class I price, implies that the over-order premiums for Class II and Class III milk at the national level are not large on average, and consequently there is probably little bias caused by using the computed effective Class I price from the blend price equation.
The estimated farm milk supply, Class I demand, and manufacturing demand equations-corresponding to equations (14) through ( 16)-are presented in table 1, while all variable definitions and data sources are listed in table 2. These equations were estimated using two-stage least squares to correct for potential simultaneity bias due to both price and quantity being endogenous variables. Quarterly national data from were used to estimate the model.
The milk supply equation (Q) was estimat- ed as a function of the milk-feed price ratio (MF or BP/P~,,~), a time trend (T), and intercept dummy variables for seasonality (D 1, D2, and D3). It was assumed that farmers formulate price expectations based on past price observations; accordingly, a polynomial distributed lag was specified for the milk-feed price ratio.z Several specifications for the lag structure were estimated, and the one that yielded the best statistical fit in terms of the adjusted coefficient of variation was selected. The second-degree polynomial distributed lag imposed with both endpoints constrained to lie close to zero and a six-quarter lag length fit the data best. The time trend variable was included as a proxy for improvements in technology over time. The intercept dummy variable for bST utilization (BST) was dropped from the model because it was not significant. The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure and the moving average error specification were employed to overcome significant first-order autocorrelation in the disturbance term. The computed long-run price elasticity of milk supply was 0.591.
Per capita Class I milk demand3 (Q, /N) was estimated as a function of the effective Class I price (Pf), per capita income (ZiVC), a time trend as a proxy for preference changes (T), current and lagged fluid advertising expenditures (branded BAf and generic GAf), and intercept dummy variables for bST utilization and seasonality (BST, and D1, D2, and D3). All prices and income variables were deflated by the consumer price index, and advertising expenditures were deflated by the media price index. A polynomial distributed lag was imposed to account for lagged generic fluid advertising effects, which is one of the most common methods of modeling advertising impacts (Forker and Ward) . As with the previous case, several lag specifications were estimated, and the one that resulted in the best statistical 2The number of cows was not included as an explanatory variable because long-run milk-feed price effects were incorporated by imposing a polynomial distributed lag.
s All quantities in the model were measured on a milk-fat equivalent basis to satisfy the equilibrium conditions. Kaiser et al.) . Current branded fluid advertising expenditures were found to be significant, but lagged expenditures were not. The elasticities of Class I demand with respect to price, income, and branded fluid advertising were -0.158, 0.258, and 0.0071, respectively. The estimated longrun generic advertising elasticity was 0.048, which was similar to Kinnucan and Forker's estimate of 0.051 in New York City, but larger than Liu et al.'s estimate of 0.0175 for retaillevel national fluid demand. It is of interest that the results show a negative and statistically significant impact of bST on Class I milk demand, Per capita manufacturing milk demand (Q./N) was estimated as a function of the manufacturing milk price (P.), per capita income (ZNC), and intercept dummy variables for bST utilization and seasonality (BS17 and D1, D2, and D3).4 Again, all prices and income were deflated by the consumer price index. A time trend as a proxy for preference changes (T) was dropped from the model because it was not significant. Advertising variables were not included in this aggregate equation because of aggregation bias due to summing up advertising expenditures for many different dairy products. The estimated elasticities of manufacturing demand with respect to price and income were -0.217 and 0.119, respectively.
Using equations (9) and (13) 
Model Validation and Advertising Scenarios
The imperfect competition model, presented by equations (14)-( 19), was completed by introducing the estimated farm milk supply with Class I and manufacturing demand equations into equations ( 14)- ( 16), and estimating values for 0 and~into equation (17). When equation (20), P~= P. + DIFF, was used instead of equation (17), the perfect competition model was created. Again, the purpose of creating the exogenous perfect competition model was to compare the results of the two models in terms of price and quantity impacts of generic milk advertising.
First, the validity of both models was determined by dynamically simulating values for the endogenous variables over a historical period , given the values for the exogenous variables using the Gauss-Seidel technique.
The mean absolute percent errors5 were calculated for each model 5The formula used to calculate the mean absolute percent error is: (l/n) XI(P -A)/Al X 100, where P is the predicted value, and A is the actual value.
and were quite similar. Since the largest error was roughly 6% (relatively small for a dynamic simulation), both models were deemed reasonable for this purpose.
To estimate the effectiveness of generic milk advertising, four scenarios were simulated based on 10% and 5070 increases, and 50% and 95?Z0decreases in generic fluid advertising expenditures in every period from the third quarter of 1976 through the third quarter of 1995. A fifth scenario was run with advertising levels set equal to historical levels in order to provide a baseline for comparison to the other four scenarios. The effectiveness of advertising was measured in terms of changes (from the baseline scenario) in Class I and manufacturing milk prices, and Class I and manufacturing milk quantities associated with the respective change in generic milk advertising expenditures.
Results
The simulation results for the various scenarios are summarized in table 4. The first column of numbers for each scenario gives the percentage change in prices and quantities due to a change in milk advertising expenditures, averaged over the period 1976.3-1995.3, generated by the imperfect competition model. The second column of numbers for each scenario provides identical information, except it corresponds to the perfect competition model. Not surprisingly, the largest discrepancy between models was the predicted impact of advertising on the Class I price. For example, in the 50?Z0increase in milk advertising scenario, the imperfect competition model predicted an increase in the Class I price of 12,5c per cwt, while the perfect competition model predicted an increase of 10.8@. In fact, for all four scenarios, the imperfect competition model consistently predicted a larger change in the Class I price due to changes in advertising. Therefore, the claim that the conventional perfect competition model understates the impact of advertising on the Class I price appears to be confirmed in this empirical simulation. However, the difference in magnitudes between models was small, indicating the bias in previous models was likely small as well.
The two models do indicate roughly the same level of advertising impact on Class I quantities. The imperfect competition model predicted a slightly lower advertising impact on Class I quantities than the perfect competition model. The two models also generated differences in terms of milk advertising impacts on the manufacturing milk market. In the 50% increase in milk advertising scenario, the imperfect competition model predicted a 9.9? per cwt increase in the manufacturing price due to changes in milk advertising, while the conventional perfect competition model predicted a 10.8@ increase. Similarly, the imperfect competition model predicted a O.19% decrease in manufacturing milk quantities due to increased milk advertising, compared with a 0.21% decrease projected by the conventional model. Similar to the Class I market results, the actual magnitude of differences between models was relatively small.
The main methodological implication of this study is that the extent of possible bias caused by assuming perfect competition in the dairy markets is rather small. The simulated values of market variables from both models were quite similar between the two models. Moreover, since the conjectural elasticity has been generally falling over time, indicating increasing competition in the market, it appears that the use of perfect competition models in future analyses of the U.S. dairy industry may be appropriate.
Clearly, from the results of both models, generic milk advertising has had an impact on the markets for both fluid and manufacturing milk. For example, the imperfect competition model predicted that a 50'% decrease in generic fluid milk advertising over the period 1976-95 would have resulted in an average decrease in the Class I price of 1.44% and an average decrease in Class I volume of almost 3Y0. This means that reducing milk advertising by 50% over this period would have resulted in an average reduction in total Class I milk revenue to farmers of 4.3%. This translates into an annual loss in revenue of $322 million, on average, from 1976-95, which is significant considering the amount of the total checkoff program (including advertising for all products, research and development, nutrition education, and overhead) over this period averaged just $206 million per year.
The model also indicated cross-commodity impacts of fluid milk advertising on the manufactured products market. For instance, a 50% decrease in fluid milk advertising would have resulted in an average decrease of 1.4% in the manufacturing milk price and a O.390 increase in manufacturing sales, because a decrease in Class I sales made more milk available for the manufacturing milk market. This translated into a decrease in total manufacturing milk revenue of 1.1%, on average, over 1976-95. Therefore, generic fluid milk advertising over this period had positive impacts for dairy farmers in both fluid and manufactured product markets.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the assumption of perfect competition in the U.S. dairy industry biases the findings of economic impacts of generic dairy advertising in the United States. Two models of the U.S. dairy industry were developed and used to simulate the impacts of generic dairy advertising: (a) an imperfect competition model, and (b) a perfect competition model. The imperfect competition model endogenized the degree of market competition using an approach similar to that of Appelbaum, The perfect competition model treated the price premiums obtained by cooperatives through bargaining power as exogenous.
The results indicate the perfect competition model understated the impact of generic milk advertising on the Class I price, and overstated the advertising impacts on Class I quantity, and on manufacturing milk price and quantity. However, the differences in magnitude of impacts between the two models were small. Therefore, the empirical results suggest the extent of bias in previous exogenous Class I premium models was likely small as well. Like virtually all previous studies, this research also confirmed that generic fluid milk advertising has had a positive impact on fluid and manufactured milk markets in the United States in terms of increasing producer prices and Class I volume.
